rate of the Community, over a five year period, could be as much as 1 % per annum higher than it would otherwise be. This would lead in particular to increased imports thereby benifitting non-member countries as well.
It is planned that all the necessary legislation to remove the three types of barriers listed above will have been passed into national law by the end of 1992. So far there is every reason to believe that this ambitious programme will be met. Inevitably it is proving difficult for the Member States to reach agreement on every aspect of the programme. Difficulties have arisen, for example in reaching agreement on removing fiscal barriers. The process of fiscal harmonisation and the development of the necessary administrative arrangements to deal with this will clearly take longer than originally envisaged in the 1985 White Paper. However, it is a reasonable assumption that the political will shall be there to resolve these problems and we can expect that at the beginning of 1993 the Community of 12 will be a zone in which goods, services, people and capital circulate without restrictions of any kind.
However, a moments reflection will show that matters cannot just stop there. The removal of physical, technical and fiscal barriers has profound implications, in particular for the conduct of economic policy. These implications mean that the integration process will not stop once the Internal Market barriers have been removed ; it is bound to go on -it cannot do otherwise.
The forces at work here are relatively easy to describe. For example :
The elimination of fiscal and physical barriers not only requires the harmonisation of indirect taxation throughout the Community but makes in any case such harmonisation virtually inescapable. This in turn reduces the room for manoeuvre in fiscal policy.
Member States will not be unable to manipulate indirect tax rates in the interest of demand management, or as a means of meeting public sector budget constraints, as they have done in the past. vergence that needs to be achieved varies from country to country.
Regarding inflation, three broad groups of countries might be distinguished :
1) The original narrow band members are already characterized by a high degree of convergence towards low inflation since inside this group inflation differentials are only about 1 %, not far from what is required by EMU.
2) More adjustment in terms of inflation is needed in Italy, Spain and the UK where inflation has now stabilized at a level that is about 3 to 5 percentage points above the best performance in the EC. However, for this group participation in Stage I should be feasible provided the adjustment is seen to continue.
3) In Portugal and Greece inflation is still above 10 % so that even participation in Stage I clearly needs more time.
Regarding the need to establish sound public finances, it is again possible to identify three groups of countries :
1) In Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom the level of the public debt/GDP ratio is declining and France and Germany are very close to this situation so that in this group of countries budget policy should be under control.
2) In Belgium, Spain and Portugal, the public debt/GDP ratio has not yet been stabilized, but this objective seems to be within reach in the near future.
3) In Greece, Italy and the Netherlands present trends in budgetary policy would lead to a rapid deterioration in the public debt/GDP ratio.
Imbalances need to be addressed during Stage I so as to achieve the necessary convergence for the following stages. Convergence to sound public finances is necessary for a stable EMU in the long run.
As regards how quickly to proceed to Stages II and III, the European The primary economic aim of EMU is to strengthen the integration of the Community and to improve its economic performance. However, due to the Community's weight EMU will also have far-reaching implications for the world economy. The ecu will emerge as a competitor to the dollar as an international currency.
Expansion of the ecu as a vehicle currency will yield some small microeconomic efficiency gains for the EC economy, by reducing transaction costs on the exchange market for trade with non-EC countries (up to 0.05 % of Community GDP), by reducing exchange rate risks due to the development of ecu invoicing (which might increase by about 10 % of EC trade), and also by giving to European banks enlarged opportunities to work in their own currency.
Regarding the official sector, EMU would allow a saving on the exchange reserves of Community Member States, amounting perhaps to USD 200 billion.
As the European currency becomes a vehicle for trade, an increase in the demand for ecu assets can also be expected in financial markets.
EMU will strengthen the Community as an economic policy pole within the world economy because adoption of a common monetary policy under the responsibility of EuroFed will enhance the Community's identity and weight in international policy cooperation. This will be.felt in macroeconomic policy coordination within the G7. Monetary coordination at this level can be expected to become easier, provided the sharing of responsibilities for exchange rate policy between EuroFed and the Council ensures an efficient handling of this policy.
As the Community becomes a policy pole, spill-over effects of domestic policies and therefore the need for coordination at the global level increase.
Since the reduction in the number of policy actors would also make it easier to reap coordination gains, EMU could act as an incentive to tighter policy coordination at the global level.
EMU could finally be a decisive building block for a more stable multipolar monetary regime. Monetary cooperation among the G7 countries still falls short of an adequate monetary system.
The EC integration process and its impact on the international economic system A . Trade EC, largest trading power in the world plays a major role in the GATT where the EC speaks with a single voice.
Although its bargaining power is substantial, if not massive, as regards third countries it still has difficulty in dealing internally with the distributional effects of trade liberalisation among the Member States. The EC lacks the instruments co-ordinated monetary and fiscal policies as well as structural policies -of a full State, such as the USA and Japan, and, therefore cannot exercise active and effective leadershiping the world.
But its commitment to the success of the UR cannot be questioned.
Through the successful outcome of the UR, the risk of Fortress Europe and of trade blocks confronting such other will fade away. In that sense, we must see EC 1992 as a step towards multilateral trade liberalisation.
B . Aid
The Community is the largest aid donor in the world. A fact not very well-
known. Combined the Community and its Member States disbursed in 1988
almost 22 billion US dollars in development aid, compared to 10 billion US dollars in the case of the USA and 9 billion US dollars in the case of Japan.
According to the latest OECD figures, Community aid as a percentage of GDP amounted to 0.5 %, compared to 0.32 % for Japan and 0.15 % for the USA. Moreover, we tend to concentrate our aid effort more on the poorest countries, as compared again to the USA and Japan.
These are the historical facts. We are committed to increase our aid flows.
The Lome IV convention, linking the Community with 68 developing countries in the Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, provides for 12 billion ECU in assistance during the 1991 to 1995 period, a real increase of 26 %. Futhermore, the Commission has recently tabled proposals to increase substantially our aid effort for Mediterranean, Asian and Latin American countries.
Quality of aid is important as well. Priorities are changing, with a greater emphasis being given to structural adjustment assistance and economic cooperation through foreign direct investment, scientific and technological cooperation schemes, etc.
Yet, our aid effort at the Community level which is growing in importance and accounts now for 15 % of total Community aid, compared to 12 % only a few years ago. It is not matched by a Community representation in the boards of the multilateral institutions like the World Bank and the regional development banks. The EBRD is an exception, and will hopefully act as a precedent. Here the integration process has not yet exercised any impact. But it will come and it should follow the enhanced role of the Community in the area of development.
C . International economic cooperation
Although there is now ample evidence that domestic policies are the key to the development of LDC's, it is also recognised that for most of them the external economic environment matters a lot.
Hence it is important that industrialised countries which, because of their sheer, economic weight play a major role in shaping up this environment, pursue efficient domestic policies and cooperate together to improve the world growth performance, and to keep inflation under control. This is done principally in the G7 framework (USA, Canada, Japan, Germany, France, Italy and United Kingdom).
The The decrease in extra-Community imports implied by the direct, static cost calculations will however diminish if regarded in the context of the economic growth brought about by indirect, market integration effects, which will also benefit producers outside the Community. In the end, even through interCommunity trade will expand much faster, the macroeconomic simulations for the Cecchini report suggest that extra-Community imports could increase as well.
The initial trade-reducing effect of the removal of trade barriers and the trade-enhancing demand increases provoked by the indirect integration effects have led to mixed reactions from the Community's main trading partners.
Positive reactions are associated with the increase in economic activity providing opportunities for extra-EC exporters on the Community-wide market.
These reactions arise notably from the industrialised countries, which are well-equipped to compete inside the Community, even though it has been estimated that also the growth rate of the value of exports of developing countries as a consequence of the completion of the internal market could increase permanently by 1 %.
The stance of countries such as the United States and Japan with respect to the dismantling of intra-Community NTBs has initially been overshadowed by fears for an increase in barriers towards non-Community countries. These fears mainly concerned two issues. The first relates to the problem that it will not be possible in the internal market to maintain intra-Community border 
